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Exploring Options for a New Farm Bill 
 
Gary M. Adams and James W. Richardson* 
 
 Members of the House Agriculture Committee have indicated an interest in rewriting the farm bill in 
2001 (The Food and Fiber Letter).  Pressure to rewrite the farm bill a year before it expires comes in part 
from the perception that the current farm bill does not provide adequate downside protection for farm 
income.  A symptom of this problem is the fact that Congress has passed substantial assistance packages to 
supplement farmers’ incomes in each of the past three years. 
 In 1998, Congress provided $5.3 billion in market loss assistance (MLA) payments and disaster 
assistance to producers aversely affected by low prices and weather-induced yield losses (USDA News 
Release 0450.98 and 0090.99).  The additional payments were distributed based on the allocations of the 
original contract payments under the FAIR Act.  In 1999, the market loss assistance payments were made 
to program crop farmers by doubling the 1999 AMTA payment rates.  Direct payments were also extended 
to oilseed producers and to dairy producers.  For year 2000, the Congress extended the market loss 
assistance payments to program crop and oilseed producers at the payment rates received in 1999.  The 
additional market loss payments received by crop producers in 1999 and 2000 averaged approximately $6 
billion per year (USDA Release 0348.00). 
 Barring widespread weather problems, the outlook for the next five years is for continued low prices 
of grains, oilseeds, cotton, and rice (FAPRI 2000 U.S. Agricultural Outlook).  Demand growth will not 
likely exceed growth in supplies over this period as export demand is expected to recover slowly.  Given 
this lack luster outlook for prices, Congress will likely see continued pressure for supplemental assistance 
payments in one form or another in 2001 and 2002. 
 Before Congress debates another assistance package or the next farm bill, we should be evaluating 
alternative policy options.  During the past year, FAPRI and AFPC were asked by Representative Charles 
Stenholm, ranking minority member of the House Agriculture Committee, to analyze the merits of 
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alternative farm programs that would transfer $1, $2, or $3 billion per year (over and above the 1996 farm 
bill) to program crop producers (FAPRI-UMC Report 07-00).  The farm program tools of interest were:  a 
supplemental income protection program, higher marketing loan rates, and additional AMTA payments.  
The analysis of these options showed that even with $3 billion per year of payments it would not be 
sufficient to reduce the cash flow problem facing farmers (Smith and Richardson). 
 The purpose of this paper is to quantify the impacts of alternative farm program tools that could be 
used to transfer $6 billion per year of additional payments to program crop and oilseed producers.  The 
program tools used for the analysis are:  a supplemental income protection (SIP) program, increased 
marketing loan rates (ML), and increased AMTA payments (AMTA).  It is assumed that Congress would 
set the payments and loan rates so that additional spending above the baseline would average $6 billion per 
year over the planning horizon, 2001-2005.  The new money comes in addition to the AMTA payments 
already in place for 2001 and 2002, and the 2002 AMTA payment rate is assumed to be extended through 
2005. 
 The remainder of the paper is organized in three parts.  The first part summarizes the four policy 
scenarios and presents the sector level analysis of the baseline and the three alternative options.  The 
second part presents the farm level impacts and the rankings of the policy options for farmers in the South. 
 The final section discusses the prospects for agriculture and the agricultural policy debate in 2001. 
Summary of Policy Assumptions 
 As previously mentioned, this paper analyzes the impacts of three alternative policy options that are 
designed to spend $30 billion (an average of $6 billion per crop year) above baseline levels for the 2001-05 
crop years.  The baseline (or BASE option) refers to the FAPRI January 2000 Agricultural Outlook, which 
assumes an indefinite extension of the provisions of the 1996 FAIR Act.  For 2003 and beyond, policies 
are held at 2002 levels. 
 The SIP option differs from the BASE option only through the introduction of the SIP program.  All 
baseline policies remain in place.  The first step in determining payments under SIP is to calculate the 
value of production for each crop.  The value of production is determined by simply multiplying national 
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production by the higher of the loan rate or the season-average farm price.  Second, the value of production 
is then calculated on a per-acre basis by dividing by U.S. harvested acres.  Third, the trigger level, or target 
value, that serves as a basis for determining payments is calculated as a percentage of the average per-acre 
value of production for the 1995-99 period.  In this analysis, the trigger value necessary to achieve the 
desired increase in spending is 103.35 percent of the 1995-99 average.  The final step calculates the 
SIP payment as the difference between the current-year value of production and the trigger level, assuming 
that this value is greater than zero.  It is important to note that the program is based on national production 
and prices.  If a payment is made in a given year, each producer of a particular crop will get the same per-
acre payment.  For example, a corn producer in Alabama will receive the same per-acre payment as a corn 
producer in Iowa.  Also, a producer in Alabama could lose a crop, but should the U.S. Value of Production 
not fall low enough, the Alabama producer would not receive a payment under this program.   
 The ML option increases marketing loan rates above Baseline levels for the 2001-05 crops.  The 
Baseline plays a key role in evaluating the impacts of this alternative.  In the FAPRI Baseline, loan rates 
for each crop are held constant at 2000 levels through 2001, but thereafter are allowed to adjust based on 
formulas in the FAIR Act.  This results in lower rates for the 2002 crop when compared to 2001, thus 
allowing for larger percentage increases in scenario loan rates than would have been the case had Baseline 
loan rates been held fixed at 2001 levels.  In addition, the relationship between projected prices and loan 
rates has a significant impact on the importance of a loan rate increase.  Given the Baseline, soybeans and 
cotton will on average realize a much larger benefit from higher loan rates than corn and wheat.  A critical 
assumption of the ML option is that loan rates for all crops are increased by the same percentage 
above Baseline levels.  In this analysis, an increase of 17.5 percent above Baseline levels is required 
to reach the spending target.    
 The third and final option, AMTA, effectively represents a continuation of what has been done in 
each of the past three years through the various supplemental assistance packages.  In the analysis, annual 
payments of $6 billion are distributed in the same fashion as the funds included in the supplemental 
packages.  As in the past, funds are also included for oilseeds.  Feed grains receive approximately 50 
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percent of additional funds while wheat collects 24 percent of the additional spending.  Payments to 
oilseeds account for 8 percent of the total. 
Sector Level Impacts of Policy Options 
 Tables 1-3 present the sector level results of each of the policy options.  In each case, the mean and 
standard deviation are based on 500 stochastic iterations through the FAPRI modeling system.  The 
simulations incorporate variability for major exogenous factors such as weather and macroeconomic 
variables.  A detailed discussion of the stochastic methodology can be found in FAPRI-UMC Report #07-
00. 
 Impacts at the sector level begin with adjustments in planted acreage in response to the different 
signals of the alternative policy options.  Under the SIP and ML options, the benefits of each program are 
crop-specific and vary directly with the number of acres or bushels produced.  As a result, the two options 
will have a direct impact on both total area as well as the crop mix.  Under the AMTA option, payments 
are theoretically decoupled from the production decision.  Any contract holder currently receiving 
payments under the FAIR Act need not plant a crop to receive those payments or any additional AMTA 
payments.  It is commonly accepted that the payments definitely have an impact on land values and cash 
rents.  However, it is less clear what the actual impacts are on aggregate acreage and crop mix.  For this 
analysis, we have not included any acreage impacts under the AMTA option.  We do not conclude that the 
additional AMTA payments would have no effect on acreage decisions, but we are not able to estimate 
specific impacts with confidence. 
 Under the SIP and ML options, the shifts in acreage are rather modest, with most changes being less 
than 1 million acres.  For the 2001-05 period, acreage under SIP increases above BASE levels for each of 
the five major crops as producers respond to the additional support provided by the program.  The most 
significant increase occurs in cotton with planted area averaging one million acres above the BASE option. 
 For each of the other crops, acreage increases by approximately 200 thousand acres.  The acreage shifts 
under the loan option are mixed due to the differences in relative benefits associated with an increase in 
loan rates.  For commodities that are “deep in the money” with Baseline loan rates, such as soybeans and 
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cotton, increased loan rates generate a substantial benefit relative to corn and wheat.  Not surprisingly, 
soybean acreage increases by 1.5 million acres above the Baseline, while cotton gains 840 thousand acres. 
Many of those acres come from feed grains and wheat, with corn and wheat losing 300 thousand and 1.2 
million acres, respectively.  The additional support of the SIP and ML options reduces the standard 
deviation of planted area relative to the BASE option. 
 The price changes in the analysis reflect the production changes brought about by the acreage shifts.  
As mentioned earlier, the changes are relatively modest with mean corn, soybean and wheat prices moving 
by less than 2 percent.  Changes are a bit more substantial for cotton and rice with declines under SIP of 
approximately 8 percent from Baseline levels. 
 After incorporating the payments under the three policy options, per-acre returns (Table 2) show some 
noticeable differences when compared across crops.  Of the three options, corn, wheat and rice returns 
show the largest gains under the AMTA option.  On a per-acre basis, rice sees the largest increase, with the 
AMTA option providing $138 in additional income.  For soybeans, higher loan rates under the ML option 
generate average additional income of $29 per acre, easily surpassing the other options.  At the mean, the 
SIP program increases cotton returns by $64 per acre, while the other two options increase returns by about 
$50.  Of the 3 alternative policy options, SIP has the greatest impact on the variability of net returns.  With 
the exception of rice, the standard deviation of returns declines dramatically under SIP.  For example, 
soybeans returns have a standard deviation of $8 per acre under SIP, as compared to $16 under the BASE. 
 In general, the reduction in variability can be attributed to the additional downside protection offered by 
the SIP option. 
 Table 3 presents the impacts of the policy options on net CCC outlays and U.S. net farm income.  By 
design, each policy option increases net CCC outlays by an annual average of $6 billion above Baseline 
levels for the 2001-05 crops.  Due to the timing of crop and fiscal years, the total additional costs of $30 
billion are spread over fiscal years 2001-06.  U.S. net farm income increases above the BASE option, but 
by less than the amount of additional spending.  In all cases, a portion of the additional government 
payments is captured by higher land values and cash rents.  The AMTA option results in a total increase of 
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$26.7 billion over calendar 2001-2006, the largest impact of the three alternatives.  The SIP and ML 
options increase farm income by $21.4 billion and $23.0 billion, respectively.  The differences between 
these options and the AMTA option can be attributed to the impacts on overall acreage and production.  
Since payments under the SIP and ML alternatives directly depend on either the number of acres harvested 
or the number of bushels produced, it is reasonable to expect that those programs will have an impact on 
overall acreage levels.  With an inelastic demand for the major crops, an increase in overall production 
levels causes a proportionately larger decline in price.  As a result, overall market net income to the crops 
sector falls.  Although a portion of this decline is captured in lower feed costs to the livestock sector, the 
total impact is negative on net farm income.  The sum effect is that $1 spent under each of these programs 
gives slightly less of a bump to net farm income than $1 spent in direct decoupled payments. 
Farm Level Impacts of Policy Options 
 The probability distributions of prices, marketing loan rates, AMTA payment rates, and SIP payments 
from the sector analysis were used directly as input in FLIPSIM to quantify the impacts of the four policy 
options on the cash flows for a dozen representative crop farms in the South.1 Four feed grain/oilseed farms, 
four cotton farms and three rice farms from the AFPC representative farm database were used for the 
analysis.  Most of these representative farms were developed in 1989-1990 and have been updated every 
three years since.  The farms are classified as large commercial family farms and generally are larger than 
the typical full-time family farms in their region.  With the help of a local extension specialist in each area, 
panels of producers were interviewed to obtain production, cost, and balance sheet data to describe the 
farms.  To validate the model, the farm panels were asked to review the simulated results for their farm data 
and revisions were made until the results matched their recent experiences. 
 Characteristics of the farms in 2000 are summarized in Appendix Table A.  The four grain farms are 
in Texas, Missouri, Tennessee, and South Carolina (TXNP, MOCG, TNG, and SCG, respectively) and a 
majority of the receipts for these farms comes from feed grains.  The four cotton farms are in Texas and 
Tennessee (TXSP, TXBC, TXCB, and TNC) and receive a majority of their revenue from cotton.  The rice 
farms are located in Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana (TXR, ARR, LAR, respectively).  The representative 
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farms annual receipts range from $230,000 to $1,500,000.  The farms were simulated over the 1996-2005 
period.  Over the 1996-1999 period, actual farm programs, prices, and yields were assumed.  At the outset 
of 1996, the farms were assumed to have 20 percent debt on land, machinery, and livestock.  Over the 
2001-2005 period, the policies consistent with the Baseline and the three alternatives were assumed.  The 
500 iterations of annual stochastic prices for each of the policy scenarios were used as input into FLIPSIM. 
 Additionally, the stochastic national crop yields associated with the sector analysis were used in FLIPSIM 
to correlate local yields to national crop yields.2  Local yields were correlated to national yields to 
appropriately simulate SIP payments that are triggered by decreases in national revenues. 
 The results of simulating the representative crop farms for the four policy options are summarized in 
Table 4.  The probability distributions of average net cash farm income over the 2001-2005 period are 
summarized in terms of their means and standard deviations.3  Additionally, the simulated probability of 
the farm having a cash flow deficit in 2005 is reported in Table 4.4 
 Under the BASE policy option, all of the representative farms are projected to have greater than a 50  
percent chance of a cash flow deficit in 2005.  This result indicates the potential for a cash flow crisis in 
agriculture if there is no change in the farm program.  The probability of a cash flow deficit in 2005 
declines significantly for 10 of the 11 farms when government payments are increased.  The Texas 
Southern Plains Cotton (TXSP) farm would see its probability of a deficit fall from 63 to 36 percent under 
the higher ML and AMTA options and to 19 percent under the SIP option.  The Arkansas rice (ARR) farm 
could see its probability of a cash flow deficit in 2005 fall from about 55 percent under the BASE to 15 
percent under the higher AMTA option.  The decreases in the chance of a deficit are smaller for the feed 
grain/oilseed farms.  For example, the Central Missouri grain (MOCG) farm could expect the chance of a 
deficit to fall from 59 percent under the BASE to 35 percent with a higher marketing loan rate. 
 Improvements in the cash flow situation for the representative farms are largely due to $6 billion of 
increased program payments to the sector changing the probability distributions for net cash farm income.  
Increased government payments raise the mean for net cash farm income, and in most all cases, reduce the 
relative risk for net income. 
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 Rankings of the policy options for the representative crop farms, based on the mean and relative risk 
for net cash farm income, are summarized in Table 5.  Increasing the marketing loan rate is preferred by 
two farms (MOCG and TNG) because of the high portion of receipts coming from soybeans.  Higher 
AMTA payment rates are ranked first for three of the farms (TXNP, TXR and ARR) due largely to the low 
yield risk on these irrigated farms.  The SIP program received six first place rankings because of two 
factors:  (a) it provides support to farms with risky yields, and (b) it tends to pay more frequently to highly 
diversified farms, such as, the SCG farm.  Ranking the policy options based on reduction in relative risk 
for net cash farm income results in the SIP option maintaining its first place ranking on 6 of the 11 farms 
(Table 5). 
 The rankings of the four farm program options changes only slightly if they are ranked based on the 
probability of a cash flow deficit in 2005.  The only change is for the SCG farm to rank higher AMTA 
payments over the SIP program (Table 5).  However, the change in rankings is not robust given it is based 
on a one percentage point change in the probabilities (Table 4). 
 The program options are also ranked based on the average ending cash reserves in 2005 and the 
average change in real net worth 2001-2005 (Table 5).  The rankings, however, are the same as when the 
program options are ranked based on average net income. 
 Generalized stochastic dominance with respect to a function was used to rank the farm program 
options as a further test of likely program preferences.  The simulated net present value (NPV) 
distributions for the farms were compared across farm program options, assuming the decision maker was 
risk averse.  The stochastic dominance rankings for the policy options show that cotton farmers (TXSP, 
TXBC, TXCB, and TNC) would prefer SIP to the other options.5  Additionally, the SCG farm that has 840 
acres of cotton ranks SIP first.  The Louisiana rice farm (LAR) would likely rank SIP highest in its 
preference schedule.  The SIP program is ranked second by two feed grain farms (TXNP and TNG) and by 
two rice farms (TXR and ARR).  The program option with the most second place preference rankings is 
the higher AMTA payment program. 
 
 9
 Certainty equivalents (CE) between the first place program option and the remaining options can be 
used to quantify the net benefits a producer would have to forego if they did not get the first place option.  
The CEs for the policy options are summarized in Table 6.6  The TXNP grain farm prefers a higher AMTA 
program and if forced to accept a SIP program instead would suffer an $116,000 decrease in NPV over the 
five year planning horizon (Table 6).  The CE also shows that a higher AMTA would increase NPV for the 
TXNP farm by $360,000 over the current farm program in the BASE. 
 Among the feed grain farms, the CE values for the second place policy options are quite small, 
ranging from 3 to 7 percent of annual cash receipts (Table 6 and Appendix Table A).  This result suggests 
that their preference for the first place policy option may not be very strong.  In contrast, the CE values for 
the four cotton farms are 11 to 17 percent of their annual cash receipts so they may have strong preferences 
for a SIP program.  The three rice farms are divided in their preferences with the TXR farm having a 
strong preference against the SIP program ($240,000 or 10 percent of receipts) and the ARR farm having a 
weak preference ($63,000 or 7 percent of receipts) against a SIP. 
 The CE values associated with the Baseline are relatively large, as a percent of cash receipts, for all 
11 farms (Table 6).  The CE for the Baseline ranges from 17 to 60 percent of annual cash receipts 
suggesting that large commercial farms have a lot to be gained from a change in policy.  Even if a farm 
does not get its first choice, the benefits can be substantial for even its second or third choice.  For 
instance, the CE between the ARR farms fourth (Baseline) and third choice (ML) is about $204,000 over 
the 2001-2005 period. 
Summary 
 At the sector level, the impacts on overall supply, demand and price are relatively modest.  Acreage 
shifts due to the policy options are generally less than two million acres, and subsequently, price changes 
are relatively modest.  The most noticeable impacts occur in the SIP option for cotton and rice.   
 For individual commodities, the question as to which policy ranks ‘best’ is related to their 
expected price levels compared to the loan rate, the proportion of historical AMTA payments the 
commodity has received, or the base period used to calculate the SIP support level.  Cotton returns, on a 
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per-acre basis, rise most under the SIP option, due mainly to the size of the payments in the first three years 
of the program.  Of the three, the ML option gives soybean producers the greatest increase in returns.  
Given the market price projections for soybeans throughout the analysis period, the increase in loan rates 
positions the soybean sector so that it would receive loan deficiency payments in nearly all years of the 
analysis.  Conversely, under the AMTA option, payments go to soybean producers based on the historical 
proportion of payments received under the earlier supplemental packages.  Thus, while the feed grains 
sector receives 50 percent of the payments, oilseed producers receive only eight percent.  Corn, wheat and 
rice see the largest gains in average per-acre returns under the AMTA option.  Rice currently receives 8 
percent of the AMTA funds, but accounts for only one percent of the area planted to the 15 major crops. 
 The farm level analysis suggests that any of the three policy options considered here would greatly 
benefit crop producers in the South.  Higher marketing loan rates, higher AMTA payment rates or a SIP 
program would significantly increase net cash farm incomes for large commercial farms.  Additionally, 
these program options would substantially reduce risk associated with net farm income, relative to 
continuation of the 1996 farm program. 
 Rankings of the Baseline and the three program alternatives do not show a clear winner across feed 
grain, cotton and rice farms in the South.  One consensus appears to be that cotton farmers would prefer 
the SIP program as defined and analyzed in this paper.  Two of the three rice farms also ranked the SIP 
program over the other programs.  Feed grain farms that receive a large portion of their receipts from 
oilseeds tend to prefer higher marketing loan rates because of the LDP benefits to soybeans.  Only three of 
the 11 representative crop farms preferred the higher AMTA payment rate option.  For these three farms 
the SIP program was ranked second.  Overall, the SIP program was ranked first or second by 10 of the 11 
representative crop farms. 
 In conclusion, we should note that the results of the analysis are not “universal.”  They are 
conditioned on the construction of the particular alternatives as well as the projections in the FAPRI 
Baseline.  In addition, the analysis does not serve as an endorsement for any particular policy option, but 
rather an objective assessment of the impacts of the alternatives.  The options analyzed in this study reflect 
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only a small sample of the alternatives that have emerged in the early stages of the farm bill debate.  It is 
expected that as the debate intensifies, new alternatives will surface and the demand for objective analysis 
will increase.  FAPRI and AFPC will continue to refine the stochastic methodology in this report and apply 
it in future policy analysis.  
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Footnotes 
 
 
1 FLIPSIM is a Monte Carlo, whole farm simulation model capable of simulating farms under 
alternative farm programs.  The model is described in detail by Richardson and Nixon. 
 
2 Crop yields are simulated multivariate empirical in FLIPSIM using the procedure described by 
Richardson, Klose and Gray.  The procedure was expanded to correlate local crop yields to national 
crop yields so that the relationship observed over the past 10 years would be repeated over the five 
year planning horizon. 
 
3 Net cash farm income is defined as total farm receipts less total cash costs including interest.  Net cash 
farm income does not include principal payments or depreciation as expenses. 
 
4 A cash flow deficit occurs when family living, principal payments, taxes, and machinery replacement 
costs exceed net cash farm income. 
 
5 A generalized stochastic dominance function in Simetar was used assuming a common risk aversion 
coefficient of 0.001 across all 11 representative farms.  See Richardson, Schumann and Feldman for a 
description of Simetar. 
 
6 Certainty equivalents were calculated assuming a risk aversion coefficient of 0.001 using Simetar. 
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Table 1. Impacts on U.S. Crop Area and Prices, 2001-05 Average 
     
 Policy Option 
 BASE SIP ML AMTA 
     
     
Corn Area (Million Acres) 
  Mean 79.3 79.6 79.0 79.3 
  Standard Deviation 2.6 1.9 2.3 2.6 
     
Soybean Area     
  Mean 72.3 72.5 73.8 72.3 
  Standard Deviation 1.9 1.4 1.6 1.9 
     
Wheat Area     
  Mean 64.9 65.1 63.7 64.9 
  Standard Deviation 2.6 1.6 2.1 2.6 
     
Upland Cotton Area     
  Mean 14.0 15.0 14.8 14.0 
  Standard Deviation 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.7 
     
Rice Area     
  Mean 3.4 3.6 3.5 3.4 
  Standard Deviation 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
     
Total Grain & Oilseed Area     
  Mean 257.8 259.4 258.5 257.8 
  Standard Deviation 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.5 
     
     
Corn Farm Price (Dollars per Unit) 
  Mean 2.23 2.22 2.25 2.23 
  Standard Deviation 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.45 
     
Soybean Farm Price     
  Mean 4.91 4.89 4.77 4.91 
  Standard Deviation 0.95 0.94 0.96 0.95 
     
Wheat Farm Price     
  Mean 3.21 3.19 3.26 3.21 
  Standard Deviation 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.52 
     
Upland Cotton Farm Price     
  Mean 0.52 0.48 0.49 0.52 
  Standard Deviation 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.07 
     
Rice Farm Price     
  Mean 7.23 6.63 6.99 7.23 
  Standard Deviation 1.09 1.18 1.11 1.09 
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Table 2. Impacts on U.S. Crop Net Returns, 2001-05 Average 
     
 Policy Option 
 BASE SIP ML AMTA 
     
     
Corn (Dollars per Acre) 
  Mean 154.82 176.29 176.69 190.14 
  Standard Deviation 34.55 23.33 31.56 34.22 
     
Soybeans     
  Mean 129.22 148.45 158.70 135.70 
  Standard Deviation 16.21 8.24 18.14 16.24 
     
Wheat     
  Mean 68.22 81.22 76.72 93.67 
  Standard Deviation 17.29 11.15 14.53 17.48 
     
Upland Cotton     
  Mean 150.43 214.30 202.11 198.18 
  Standard Deviation 41.31 31.84 49.55 41.62 
     
Rice     
  Mean 212.13 282.96 261.32 350.17 
  Standard Deviation 50.16 51.76 51.78 54.70 
     
     
     
Table 3. Impacts on Aggregate Measures, 2001-06 Average 
     
 Policy Option 
 BASE SIP ML AMTA 
     
     
Net CCC Outlays, Fiscal Yr (Billion Dollars) 
  Mean 11.82 16.82 16.82 16.82 
  Standard Deviation 3.45 5.23 5.26 3.45 
     
Net Farm Income, Calendar Yr     
  Mean 40.59 44.15 44.42 45.03 
  Standard Deviation 6.10 5.88 6.87 6.41 
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Table 4.  Impacts of Alternative Farm Policy Options on the Income and Cash Flows of Representative Crop 
Farms
 Baseline Loan AMTA SIP 
 Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev Mean   Std Dev Mean   Std Dev 
 Average Annual Net Cash Farm Income 2001-2005 ($1000) 
TXNP1 219.5 171.9 355.4 163.3 361.3 168.5 311.4 143.5 
MOCG 219.4 76.1 296.7 79.8 273.2 74.5 271.2 68.9 
TNG 52.8 76.7 126.6 78.1 102.0 75.8 113.6 67.2 
SCG 272.9 128.9 356.0 132.9 363.1 127.2 379.2 119.1 
TXSP 181.8 81.6 264.4 89.0 249.3 79.9 339.7 78.7 
TXBC 47.4 16.0 66.5 16.0 71.7 15.9 82.0 12.1 
TXCB 83.7 61.6 121.3 66.3 119.9 59.8 133.2 56.7 
TNC 29.7 157.2 185.7 170.7 119.9 156.0 221.1 148.1 
TXR -65.2 63.1 64.0 65.6 188.4 57.5 92.3 59.7 
ARR 256.4 47.4 355.5 51.7 388.1 46.6 354.0 43.2 
LAR -62.7 23.6 -25.9 25.9 -16.6 23.6 -8.8 23.5 
       
 Probability of a Cash Flow Deficit in 2005 (%) 
TXNP 66.8  41.8  43.6  54.6  
MOCG 59.4  35.4  44.6  47.2  
TNG 90.8  69.2  79.2  79.8  
SCG 58.2  47.4  42.8  43.8  
TXSP 63.2  36.2  36.8  19.2  
TXBC 86.0  68.2  58.0  53.6  
TXCB 55.4  45.6  43.6  41.0  
TNC 96.4  84.4  90.6  79.4  
TXR 98.6  86.2  37.0  85.4  
ARR 54.6  27.6  15.2  31.8  
LAR 99.0  99.0  99.0  99.0  
 
1 The abbreviated names for the farms are explained in Appendix A. 
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Table 5.  Policy Option Rankings Based on Alternative Performance Variables. 
      
 Average Net Income 
Relative Risk 
of Net Income 
Prob. of a 
Deficit 2005 
Average Cash 
Balance 2005 
Average 
Change RNW1 
      
Feed grain      
 TXNP2 AMTA ML ML AMTA AMTA 
 MOCG ML ML ML ML ML 
 TNG ML ML ML ML ML 
 SCG SIP SIP AMTA SIP SIP 
Cotton      
 TXSP SIP SIP SIP SIP SIP 
 TXBC SIP SIP SIP SIP SIP 
 TXCB SIP SIP SIP SIP SIP 
 TNC SIP SIP SIP SIP SIP 
Rice      
 TXR AMTA AMTA AMTA AMTA AMTA 
 ARR AMTA AMTA AMTA AMTA AMTA 
 LAR SIP SIP SIP SIP SIP 
 
1 RNW is real net worth over the 2001-2005 planning horizon. 
 
2 The abbreviated names for the farms are explained in Appendix A. 
 
Table 6.  Rankings and Certainty Equivalents of Farm Program Options for Risk Averse Decision 
Makers on Representative Crop Farms. 
 Baseline Higher Loan Higher AMTA SIP 
Feed grain/Oilseeds     
 TXNP1 4(360)2 3(102) 1 2(116) 
 MOCG 4(166) 1 2(49) 3(50) 
 TNG 4(228) 1 3(77) 2(35) 
 SCG 4(250) 3(83) 2(45) 1 
Cotton     
 TXSP 4(357) 2(173) 3(199) 1 
 TXBC 4(86) 3(39) 2(26) 1 
 TXCB 4(133) 3(39) 2(38) 1 
 TNC 4(596) 2(178) 3(318) 1 
Rice     
 TXR 4(722) 3(330) 1 2(240) 
 ARR 4(271) 3(67) 1 2(63) 
 LAR 4(169) 3(56) 2(27) 1 
 
1 The abbreviated names for the farms are explained in Appendix A. 
 
2 The first value is the preference ranking for a policy option assuming the decision maker is risk averse.  
The value in parenthesis is the certainty equivalents in thousands of dollars that the decision maker 
would be willing to pay in order to gain access to the preferred policy option. 
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Appendix Table A.  Characteristics of Representative Crop Farms. 
  TXNP1 MOCG TNG SCG TXSP TXBC TXCB TNC TXR ARR LAR 
         
Total Cropland (acres) 6,700 3,300 2,400 3,500 3,697 1,400 1,720 3,800 3,750 3,400 1,100 
Acres Owned 1,100 1,600 482 1,400 1,627 150 360 1,520 1,688 1,020 50 
Acres Leased 5,600 1,700 1,918 2,100 2,070 1,250 1,360 2,280 2,062 2,380 1,050 
         
Assets in 2000 ($1,000)         
Total 2,760 4,307 1,079 3,846 1,776 548 891 8,485 2,508 3,779 428 
Real Estate 896 3,198 138 2,551 969 279 460 6,929 1,327 2,042 87 
Machinery 1,389 638 704 931 759 195 280 1,340 650 992 342 
Other & Livestock 475 470 237 365 49 75 151 216 530 746  
         
Total Gross Receipts         
in 2000 ($1,000) 1,585 667 663 1,445 982 230 311 1,264 1,181 833 270 
         
         
Planted Acres in 2000         
Total 6,030 3,300 3,000 4,400 3,164 1,400 1,720 4,100 1,700 3,500 902 
         
Feed Grains 3,685 1,319 1,200 1,400 950 1,020 532    
         
Soybeans 670 1,881 1,200 1,260  760  1,700 362 
         
Cotton    840 2,665 350 700 2,508    
         
Rice      1,500 1,300 540 
         
Wheat 1,675 100 600 900 100  300  500  
         
Other and CRP     499  200   
 
1 Farm names are abbreviated as follows:  TXNP is Texas Northern Plains grain, MOCG is Central Missouri grain, TNG is Tennessee grain, SCG 
is South Carolina grain, TXSP is Texas Southern Plains cotton, TXBC is Texas Blacklands cotton, TXCB is Texas Coastal Bend cotton, TNC is 
Tennessee cotton, TXR is Texas rice, ARR is Arkansas rice, and LAR is Louisiana rice. 
 
